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NOTE†
THE KEY PROBLEMS WITH QUI TAM
DISMISSALS UNDER SWIFT
HOLLY GWYDIR*
I
INTRODUCTION
In 2018, the federal government spent $1.59 trillion on the military and health
industries alone, with $623 billion allocated for military expenditures, $582 billion
for Medicare costs, and $389 billion for Medicaid costs.1 In the same year, the
rate of improper payment for Medicare and Medicaid was 8 percent and 9.79
percent, respectively, resulting in more than $80 billion in losses of taxpayer
money to fraudulent or improper healthcare claims.2 While the rate of fraud in
the defense industry is more difficult to establish, over 1,000 cases of defense
contracting fraud were filed from 2013 to 2017, resulting in the recovery of over
$800 million.3 This is likely a fraction of the amount lost due to defense
contracting fraud. Between the two industries, the American taxpayers are likely
losing close to $100 billion dollars per year due to fraudulent payments and
improper claims. These staggering statistics leave taxpayers wondering, how do
we get it back?
One method of recourse for taxpayers lies in the False Claims Act (FCA).
Congress passed the FCA to encourage citizens through economic incentives to
report fraud committed against the government.4 The FCA authorizes qui tam
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1. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE FEDERAL BUDGET IN 2018 (2019),
https://www.cbo.gov/publication/55342 [https://perma.cc/FW38-J7V4].
2. CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES, 2019 ESTIMATED IMPROPER PAYMENT
RATES FOR CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES PROGRAMS (2019),
https://www.cms.gov/newsroom/fact-sheets/2019-estimated-improper-payment-rates-centers-medicaremedicaid-services-cms-programs [https://perma.cc/PW8L-K2U4].
3. Peter Suciu, Defense Contracting Fraud Remains an Ongoing Issue, CLEARANCE JOBS (May 14,
2019), https://news.clearancejobs.com/2019/05/14/defense-contracting-fraud-remains-an-ongoing-issue/
[https://perma.cc/MH4K-48SY].
4. JOEL M. ANDROPHY & NORMAN W. BLACK, FEDERAL FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND QUI TAM
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actions, which allow private individuals called “relators” to bring suit against
federal contractors on behalf of the government. In 2017, qui tam suits resulted
in the recovery of over $3.7 billion in taxpayer money, $2.48 billion of which was
related to fraudulent charges for health care and $220 million of which was from
the defense industry.5 In exchange for their efforts to administer justice to
perpetrators of fraud, relators are entitled to a portion of the recovery; today, this
is between fifteen and thirty percent of the damages awarded.6 In 2017, relators
received over $478 million in awards in total.7
Because relators in qui tam actions pursue a suit on behalf of the government,
the Department of Justice (DOJ) is given significant control over the litigation.
Individual filers must first refer the case to the DOJ, which may choose to
intervene and take over litigation of the suit.8 If the DOJ decides not to intervene,
the individual can pursue the lawsuit independently. Generally, intervention
strengthens a case considerably and increases the likelihood of a favorable
settlement for the relator.9 However, relators sometimes find involvement by the
DOJ to be unwelcome.
In addition to the intervention right, the DOJ retains the power to settle and
dismiss qui tam suits over the objections of relators.10 The dismissal right is a
controversial power for the DOJ to exercise, partially because pursuing recourse
for fraudulent conduct through a qui tam suit is not an easy task. Relators are
often subjected to retaliation at the hands of their former employers, which may
take the form of termination, harassment, or debarment, and even criminal
activity such as break-ins to the relator’s home.11 Where a suit is dismissed over
relator objections, relators take all the risk with none of the reward. In some
jurisdictions, regardless of whether a complaint is meritorious, the DOJ has the
right to dismiss actions without showing a rational purpose for the dismissal,
leaving open the possibility for improper incentives to underlie dismissal
motions.12 Thus, a meritorious suit with the potential to recover taxpayer money
LITIGATION § 2.04 (2020).
5. Analysis of DOJ’s $3.7 Billion in False Claims Act Recoveries in FY 2017 Suggests Interesting
Trends, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.winston.com/en/thoughtleadership/analysis-of-DOJ-s-3-7-billion-in-false-claims-act-recoveries-in.html [https://perma.cc/3KJU2FBM].
6. ANDROPHY & BLACK, supra note 4.
DEPARTMENT
OF
JUSTICE,
FRAUD
STATISTICSOVERVIEW
(2019),
7. U.S.
https://www.justice.gov/civil/page/file/1080696/download?utm_medium=email&utm_source=govdeliver
y [https://perma.cc/F22V-HP9Y].
8. ANDROPHY & BLACK, supra note 4.
9. David Freeman Engstrom, Agencies as Litigation Gatekeepers, 123 YALE L.J. 616, 657, 661
(2013).
10. False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2) (2018).
11. See Whistleblower: The Case Against Northrop (CBS television broadcast July 27, 2018)
(narrating the case of qui tam relator James Holzrichter, who experienced break-ins and tampering with
his car and was banned from the defense industry after bringing suit against Northrup Grumman,
eventually ending up homeless with his family before settling the lawsuit).
12. See Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (holding that the DOJ has unfettered
discretion to dismiss qui tam suits).
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may be dismissed for reasons that are not in the public interest.
Federal circuit courts are divided on the standard by which the DOJ may
dismiss qui tam suits.13 In 1998, the Ninth Circuit held in United States ex rel.
Sequoia Orange, Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp. that the DOJ must identify a
valid governmental purpose and show a rational relation between dismissal and
accomplishment of that purpose before a dismissal motion may be granted.14 In
reaching this conclusion, the court focused on language in the FCA that requires
court approval for a dismissal and provides relators with a right to a court hearing
on the dismissal action.15 The court also analyzed the legislative history of the
FCA and determined that Congress intended for qui tam suits to provide a
limited check on prosecutorial discretion.16 Thus, the Ninth Circuit held that
prosecutors should not retain the unlimited right to dismiss suits.
In 2003, the D.C. Circuit disagreed in Swift v. United States, holding instead
that the DOJ has “unfettered discretion” to dismiss qui tam suits.17 The court
reasoned that because these lawsuits are an extension of the executive branch’s
arm of enforcement, the DOJ has exclusive discretion to settle or dismiss the
lawsuits under the Take Care Clause of the Constitution.18
In August 2020, the Seventh Circuit complicated the matter. In United States
ex rel. CIMZNHCA, LLC v. UCB, Inc., the court straddled the holdings of the
Ninth and the D.C. Circuit courts, and ultimately found that the standard was
“much nearer to Swift than Sequoia Orange.”19 However, the court
acknowledged the existence of background constraints on executive action and
potential due process concerns posed by an unfettered right to dismiss.20 This
approach was followed most recently by the Third Circuit in Polansky v.
Executive Health Resources, Inc. in October 2021.21
At the center of much of the disagreement is the question of whether the
language of the FCA provides judicial review of a motion to dismiss a qui tam
suit filed by the government. The FCA requires the court to provide the relator
with an opportunity for a hearing on the dismissal motion, as well as “written
consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.”22 The courts in both
Sequoia Orange and CIMZNHCA interpreted this language to require
substantive judicial review of motions to dismiss, but disagreed on when this must

13. United States ex rel. CIMZNHCA, LLC v. UCB, Inc., 970 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2020); Swift, 318
F.3d at 252; United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139 (9th
Cir. 1998).
14. Sequoia Orange Co., 151 F.3d at 1145.
15. Id.; 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1), 3730(c)(2)(A).
16. Sequoia Orange Co., 151 F.3d at 1146.
17. Swift, 318 F.3d at 252.
18. Id. at 253.
19. United States ex rel. CIMZNHCA, LLC v. UCB, Inc., 970 F.3d 835, 840 (7th Cir. 2020).
20. Id. at 849.
21. Polansky v. Exec. Health Res., 17 F.4th 376, 385 (3d Cir. 2021).
22. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).
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apply.23 Alternatively, Swift found that the language provided only a formalistic
role for courts, rather than a substantive or discretionary power.24
The DOJ’s power to dismiss a qui tam suit without judicial review presents
problems for relators’ rights and taxpayer interests. To begin with, the power to
dismiss qui tam suits with unfettered discretion provides a greater opportunity
for corrupt or improper incentives to influence DOJ officials. For example,
through situations such as the investigation into Russian interference with the
2016 election and the granting of Presidential pardons, the Trump administration
made it abundantly clear that the White House has the power to exert undue
influence over the DOJ.25 Throughout history, numerous presidential
administrations have demonstrated the pitfalls of this political influence over the
DOJ.26
Further, the DOJ may be susceptible to regulatory capture. Departments and
administrative agencies like the DOJ may be “captured” when some special
interest “persuades government actors to exercise the coercive power of the state
in ways that are not in the ‘public interest.’”27 Studies show that the DOJ may not
be the most impartial agency, and may in fact be vulnerable to capture by
interests that overcome those of taxpayers.28 Susceptibility to capture makes the
power to dismiss suits without judicial oversight exceedingly problematic. This is
especially true given that many qui tam suits are filed against top government
contractors.29 There is a documented “revolving door” between the Department
of Defense (DOD) and federal contractors, which presents a risk of bias on the
part of the government in handling allegations of fraud.30 The potential for unfair
dismissal of meritorious claims over the objections of relators is especially
alarming in consideration of the hardship that relators may endure while
pursuing punishment of fraudulent and unlawful behavior.31
This Note argues that the correct standard for qui tam dismissals is that of the
Ninth Circuit, which calls on the DOJ to present a valid governmental purpose
for the dismissal of qui tam lawsuits. As support for this conclusion, this Note

23. CIMZNHCA, LLC, 970 F.3d at 853; United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece
Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1145 (9th Cir. 1998).
24. Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
25. Andrew McCanse Wright, The Take Clare Clause, Justice Department Independence, and White
House Control, 121 W. Va. L. Rev. 353, 359–60 (2013).
26. Todd David Peterson, Federal Prosecutorial Independence, 15 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y
217, 264 (2020).
27. M. Elizabeth Magill, Courts and Regulatory Capture, in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE
397, 401 (Daniel Carpenter & David Moss eds., 2014).
28. David Freeman Engstrom, Harnessing the Private Attorney General: Evidence from Qui Tam
Litigation, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1244, 1256 (2012).
29. WINSTON & STRAWN LLP, supra note 5.
30. MARSHALL B. CLINARD, CORPORATE CORRUPTION: THE ABUSE OF POWER 88 (1990).
31. See Whistleblower: The Case Against Northrop, supra note 11 (narrating the case of qui tam
relator James Holzrichter, who experienced break-ins and tampering with his car and was banned from
the defense industry after bringing suit against Northrup Grumman, eventually ending up homeless with
his family before settling the lawsuit).
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argues that the DOJ, as an administrative agency, is not always likely to be
impartial and is in fact vulnerable to political influence and regulatory capture.
This justifies the application of the stricter, yet still permissive, Ninth Circuit
standard. Part II examines the history of the FCA and qui tam lawsuits,
explaining and analyzing the holdings of each circuit regarding the DOJ’s right
to dismiss qui tam suits. Part III conducts a statutory analysis of the FCA, with
specific attention to the legislative history of the Act and its 1986 Amendments.
It concludes that the statutory language of the FCA, which requires judicial
consent to dismissal and establishes the right to a hearing for relators, provides
discretionary power to the judiciary in reviewing dismissal actions. Part IV
addresses the vulnerability of the DOJ to influence by political actors and to
regulatory capture, concluding that the agency is not sufficiently impartial and
independent to justify unfettered discretion to dismiss qui tam lawsuits. Instead,
Part V argues that this role is better filled by the judiciary. Part V also addresses
the due process concerns created by the Swift standard and concludes that this
issue is substantial. While this conclusion supports the need for judicial review,
deeper analysis is required.
II
BACKGROUND
A. History of the FCA
Congress enacted the FCA in 1863, known at the time as Lincoln’s Law, to
combat rampant fraud committed against the United States government during
the Civil War.32 Civilian contractors and even members of the military exploited
the war by procuring payment from the government for fraudulent expenses,
resulting in $17 million in government losses for false payment.33 Conduct such
as supplying the Army with ammunition shells filled with sawdust, and selling
rifles valued at $17,500 to the government for over $100,000, was commonplace.
In one instance, the federal government paid Brooks Brothers to provide
uniforms to Union soldiers.34 The uniforms the company delivered were useless,
as they were made of deficient material and lacked necessary components such
as pockets. A prominent politician tasked with inspecting the uniforms was
blamed for the loss, and allegations were made that the politician had profited
off of the debacle. Following this incident, Congress created a committee to
investigate the complicity of public officials in the rampant fraud. The committee
discovered that many government officials had turned a blind eye to the
fraudulent behavior during the war, and even received kickbacks from
contractors for doing so.35 These actions called “into question the honor or good
32. ANDROPHY & BLACK, supra note 4.
33. Id. This would be over $350 million today.
34. FRED SHANNON, THE ORGANIZATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNION ARMY 18611865 57–8 (1965).
35. Id.; ANDROPHY & BLACK, supra note 4 (“This extraordinary number of fraudulent schemes
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judgment of men high in political and military councils of the country.”36
To combat this fraud, the FCA permitted private individuals known as
“relators” to pursue damages on behalf of the United States against contractors
who committed fraud against the government.37 The FCA applied to fraud
committed by all government contractors, with a specific focus on military
contractors. Defendants convicted under the FCA were subjected to significant
fines and imprisonment for up to five years, and fines increased for military
personnel. Relators were originally entitled to half of the total financial recovery
of these suits.
Relators serve several purposes. First, they serve as informants who notify
federal officials of fraudulent conduct that may be discoverable only by those
within the corporation.38 Without whistleblowers, the federal government would
be crippled in its pursuit of discovering, punishing, and deterring such unlawful
behavior. Second, relators fill a gaping hole in enforcement that is caused by a
severe lack of resources of government agencies. In 2018, qui tam suits resulted
in the recovery of over $2.1 billion in taxpayer money.39 In contrast, non-qui tam
suits filed under the FCA recovered only $767 million.40 Finally, relators also
assist in alerting the public and other federal agencies to the unlawful behavior
of public officials who turn a blind eye to corrupt government contractors, which
may include the DOJ.41
Since the FCA’s inception, critics have regarded qui tam suits with
widespread disfavor.42 Critics most often object to the relators’ alleged
manipulation of the suits to secure individual advantages and payouts. In 1942,
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess held that relators could bring qui tam suits
based solely on information contained in a criminal indictment, about which the
relator had no first-hand knowledge.43 This decision was heavily criticized.44 In
response to the disapproval, the FCA was amended in 1943.45 The amendment
resulted from the collusion of contractors and corrupt Government officials who received kickbacks in
exchange for their willful blindness.”).
36. SHANNON, supra note 34, at 58.
37. ANDROPHY & BLACK, supra note 4.
38. Id. at § 2.02.
39. Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, Justice Department Recovers
Over $2.8 Billion from False Claims Act Cases in Fiscal Year 2018 (Dec. 21, 2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-recovers-over-28-billion-false-claims-act-cases-fiscalyear-2018 [https://perma.cc/52F9-TSME]. Of this, independent qui tam relators produced $118 million in
actions where the DOJ declined to intervene, due in part to scarcity of resources. Id.
40. Id.
41. ANDROPHY & BLACK, supra note 4, at § 2.02; H.R. REP. NO. 99-3753, at 354 (1985) (statement
of Mr. Helmer arguing that the problem with permitting the Justice Department to settle cases without
court supervision “is that it allows a sweetheart deal to be worked out between the Government and the
contractor.”).
42. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 127 F.2d 233, 235 (3d Cir. 1942).
43. Id. at 238.
44. ANDROPHY & BLACK, supra note 4, at § 2.05.
45. Pub. L. No. 78-213, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (1943) (amended 1986); ANDROPHY & BLACK, supra
note 4, at § 2.05.
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eliminated qui tam suits that were brought based on information that was already
known to the government. Further, the amendment gave the Attorney General
the power to intervene in any qui tam suit, and the relator’s recovery was reduced
to twenty-five percent if there was no intervention and ten percent if the Attorney
General intervened.
The 1943 amendments reduced the incentives for relators to bring suit to such
an extent that witnesses to wrongdoing no longer could justify reporting the
unlawful activity.46 During congressional hearings on the issue in 1986, witnesses
to fraud testified that they feared being fired, experiencing retaliatory action, and
becoming targets of harassment.47 One witness concluded that employees of
government contractors felt there was “no incentive to report fraud in the
defense industry and that the fear of employer retaliation instead created a great
disincentive.”48 Following the 1943 amendments, the FCA was no longer an
effective tool for addressing fraud, and the prevalence of qui tam suits rapidly
decreased.49
B. The FCA Today
The FCA as we know it today developed from further amendments passed in
1986. The 1986 amendments sought to reinvigorate the FCA in response to
reports of increased fraud by government contractors during the Cold War.50
Another factor was an increasing prevalence of “sweetheart deals” between
government officials and defense contractors at this time.51 These changes sought
to address this influx of fraud by enhancing incentives for relators to file qui tam
actions.52 Most importantly, the 1986 amendments allows relators to continue on
as a party in the suit even where the government intervenes and provides a cause
of action for any relator who was terminated, suspended, harassed, or otherwise
discriminated against as a result of involvement in a qui tam suit.53 In relevant
part, the statute provides that:
(b)(1) A person may bring a civil action for a violation of section 3729 for the person
and for the United States Government. The action shall be brought in the name of the
Government. The action may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General
give written consent to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting . . .
(c)(1) If the Government proceeds with the action, it shall have the primary

46. CLINARD, supra note 30, at 88–89.
47. S. REP. NO. 99-345, 85 (1986).
48. Id.
49. ANDROPHY & BLACK, supra note 4, at § 2.06.
50. Id. at § 2.06 (explaining that in 1986, “of the top 100 defense contractors, 45% were currently
under investigation” and “[i]n one year alone (1986) the five largest defense contractors had all either
been indicted or convicted of criminal violations.”).
51. CLINARD, supra note 30, at 88–89.
52. ANDROPHY & BLACK, supra note 4, at § 2.06. The General Accounting Office reported that a
vast majority of fraud goes undetected, and thus few contractors were ever punished. Id. As
acknowledged by Congress in passing the original FCA, an effective method of increasing detection of
fraud is incentivizing witnesses to fraud to report the behavior. Id.
53. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1), (h)(1).
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responsibility for prosecuting the action, and shall not be bound by an act of the person
bringing the action. Such person shall have the right to continue as a party to the action,
subject to the limitations set forth in paragraph (2).54

Lastly, the amendments clarified relator recovery, and provided that without
government intervention, relators are entitled to twenty five to thirty percent of
the recovery.55 If the government does intervene, relators are entitled to fifteen
to twenty percent of the recovery.56 These amendments were primarily intended
to increase protections for relators and create greater incentives for individuals
to report fraudulent conduct.57 “Congress wanted to reward private individuals
who take significant personal risks to bring wrongdoing to light, to break
conspiracies of silence among employees of malfeasors, and to encourage
whistleblowing and disclosure of fraud.”58
As qui tam suits are technically an arm of executive enforcement, the
government wields significant control over the suits. Relators must first provide
the government with the complaint and any material evidence before filing suit.59
The DOJ has the right to intervene in any qui tam suit within sixty days of
receiving the complaint. After sixty days, the relator may proceed
independently.60 Importantly, however, the government retains the right to
intervene at any point during the course of the proceedings. If the government
intervenes, “it shall have the primary responsibility for prosecuting the action,
and shall not be bound by an act of the relator.”61 The DOJ also has significant
control over the settlement or dismissal of cases. Section (c)(2) provides:
(A) The Government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the
person initiating the action if the person has been notified by the Government of the
filing of the motion and the court has provided the person with an opportunity for a
hearing on the motion.
(B) The Government may settle the action with the defendant notwithstanding the
objections of the person initiating the action if the court determines, after a hearing,
that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the
circumstances. Upon a showing of good cause, such hearing may be held in camera.62

Where the standard for approving settlements in (c)(2)(B) appears clear, the
same cannot be said for the standard for granting dismissal motions. The
ambiguity has sparked disagreement amongst courts.
C. The Circuit Split Regarding Dismissal
Congress has not affirmatively proscribed the standard by which the
government may dismiss qui tam suits over the objections of relators. Courts are
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.

§ 3730(b)(1), (c)(1).
§ 3730(d)(2).
§ 3730(d)(1).
ANDROPHY & BLACK, supra note 4, at § 2.06.
United States v. Bank of Farmington, 166 F.3d 853, 858 (7th Cir. 1999).
§ 3730(b)(2).
§ 3730(b)(4).
§ 3730(c)(1).
§ 3730(c)(2).
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divided on how much discretion the government should be given on this issue.
The Ninth Circuit addressed the subject first in 1998 in Sequoia Orange.63 Sequoia
Orange, a company that grows and packs citrus and fruits, filed numerous qui
tam actions against other growers and packinghouses in the citrus industry.64 The
company alleged that the defendants committed fraud by shipping goods in
excess of the federal allotment under marketing orders set in 1984. The
Government decided to dismiss the suits upon the suspension of the marketing
orders after officials changed course on the policy. Sequoia Orange argued that
the suits could not be dismissed unless they lacked merit. Prior case precedent
described the government’s right to dismiss qui tam actions as “a matter within
the government’s prosecutorial discretion in enforcing federal laws,” but it
remained unclear whether this gave the Government an unlimited and
unreviewable right of dismissal.65
The court in Sequoia Orange acknowledged that the statute does not set a
standard for dismissal. Instead, the court relied primarily upon the legislative
history of the FCA. While the 1986 amendments to the FCA expanded the role
of relators in qui tam suits, the court reasoned that the government still retains
primary control and responsibility over the suit after intervention.66 However, the
court held that this does not give the government absolute, unchecked discretion
in dismissal. Instead, a meritorious suit may be dismissed only upon a proper
showing.
The court adopted a two-step analysis to test the government’s justifications
for dismissal, which requires the identification of a valid governmental purpose
and a rational relation between dismissal and accomplishment of that purpose.
Upon satisfaction of this test, the burden then switches to the relator “to
demonstrate that dismissal is fraudulent, arbitrary, capricious, or illegal.”67 The
court determined that this test does not create a separation of powers issue, as it
requires “no greater justification of the dismissal motion than is mandated by the
Constitution itself.”68 In Sequoia Orange, the court held that the Government, in
dismissing the suit, had a valid purpose that was rationally related to the
dismissal: for example, aligning with policy changes and ending divisiveness in
the citrus industry.69 Since this decision in 1998, the Tenth Circuit and several
district courts have fallen in line with the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Sequoia
Orange.70

63. 151 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 1998).
64. Id. at 1141–42.
65. Id. at 1143.
66. Id. at 1144–45.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 1146.
69. Id. at 1147.
70. See Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding that the government
met its burden to establish a rational basis to dismiss the suit to further a legitimate government purpose
of preventing the disclosure of classified information); United States ex rel. Campie v. Gilead Scis., Inc.,
No. C-11-0941 EMC, 2015 WL 3659765, at *8–9 (N.D. Cal. June 12, 2015) (dismissing the suit because
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The D.C. Circuit disagreed with Sequoia Orange’s holding in 2003 in Swift v.
United States.71 In that case, the relator brought a qui tam suit alleging that the
defendant had committed fraud related to time sheets and leave slips, resulting
in $6,100 in damages. The Government argued that the low recoverable damages
did not justify the expense of litigation and moved to dismiss. The court declined
to adopt the Sequoia Orange test, reasoning that nothing in the FCA provided
for judicial oversight of the Executive’s judgment in dismissing suits. The court
based this decision on § 3730(c)(2)(A), which states that the government may
dismiss an action. The court reasoned that this language suggests the absence of
judicial review because it places the power to dismiss in the hands of the
government alone. Further, the court reasoned that the relator’s right to a
hearing, as proscribed in § 3730(c)(2)(A), functions only to give the relator a
formal opportunity to convince the government not to end the case.72
The court ultimately held that the Government has an unfettered right to
dismiss a qui tam action. As support for this determination, the court explained
that under the Constitution, the executive has the duty to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,” and thus the executive has absolute discretion on
whether to dismiss an action on behalf of the United States.73 Several other
district courts, but no circuit courts, have agreed with Swift.74
The Seventh Circuit contributed the most recent addition to the controversy
in August of 2020. In United States ex rel. CIMZNHCA, LLC v. UCB, Inc., the
relators alleged that defendants gave unlawful kickbacks to physicians for
prescribing or recommending a drug the defendants manufactured.75 The
Government argued that the relators’ claims lacked merit sufficient to justify the
cost of investigation and a suit would be contrary to the public interest. The DOJ
filed a motion to dismiss. At the trial level, the Government urged the court to
adopt the Swift standard, while the relators argued for the more stringent Sequoia
Orange standard. The trial court sided with the relators and found the
Government’s evaluation of the defendants’ actions to be insufficient. Holding
that the Government’s decision to dismiss was arbitrary and capricious, and not
rationally related to a valid governmental purpose, the trial court denied the

relators failed to allege sufficient facts to state a claim under the worthless services theory); United States
ex rel. Toomer v. TerraPower, LLC, No. 4:16-cv-00226-DCN, 2018 WL 4934070, at *10 (D. Idaho Oct.
10, 2018) (“To obtain a dismissal of a qui tam action, the Government must (1) identify a valid
governmental purpose for the dismissal; and (2) demonstrate a rational relation between dismissal and
accomplishment of the purpose.”).
71. 318 F.3d 250 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
72. Id. at 252–53.
73. Id. at 253.
74. See Health Choice All., LLC ex rel. United States v. Eli Lilly & Co., No. 5:17-CV-123-RWSCMC, 2019 WL 2520165 (E.D. Tex. May 16, 2019) (granting Government’s motion to dismiss without
applying the rational relation test); United States ex rel. Sibley v. Delta Reg’l Med. Ctr., No. 4:17-cv000053-GHD-RP, 2019 WL 1305069 (N.D. Miss. Mar. 21, 2019) (same); United States ex rel. Maldonado
v. Ball Homes, LLC, No. 5: 17-379-DCR, 2018 WL 3213614, at *3 (E.D. Ky. June 29, 2018) (agreeing
with the D.C. Circuit that the government has unfettered discretion to dismiss a qui tam suit).
75. United States ex rel. CIMZNHCA, LLC v. UCB, Inc., 970 F.3d 835, 839–40 (7th Cir. 2020).
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motion to dismiss.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit straddled the holdings of Sequoia Orange and
Swift. The court stated that the competing standards are based on a
“misunderstanding of the government’s rights and obligations under the
[FCA].”76 The court stated that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41 would apply
where the government had intervened and the defendants had not yet filed an
answer to the complaint, “as limited by any more specific provision of the [FCA]
and any applicable background constraints on executive conduct in general.”77
Under these circumstances, the government is not required to show any rational
purpose for dismissal.
However, the court acknowledged that where the government’s opportunity
to serve a notice of dismissal has passed under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
41, then a hearing under the FCA “could serve to air what terms of dismissal are
proper.”78 The court reasoned that the right to a hearing is not a meaningless
administrative procedure, as the court in Swift had found. Further, the executive
branch could not be exempt from review because the FCA gives the relator an
interest in the lawsuit as well as a portion of the damages. Thus, a dismissal must
not exercise coercive power over an individual’s liberty or property rights, and a
standard that protects an individual’s basic due process rights was required. Thus,
the court held that in this narrow circumstance, the Sequoia Orange test would
apply.79
III
STATUTORY ANALYSIS
A. The Statute Provides Discretionary Power to the Judiciary in Reviewing
Motions to Dismiss Qui Tam Suits
As demonstrated by the circuit dispute, the FCA does not explicitly
enumerate a standard of dismissal for qui tam suits. However, the statutory
language does indicate that the court retains the power to exercise discretion in
reviewing dismissal actions. The statute proscribes two functions for the court
regarding dismissal of qui tam suits. Section 3730(b)(1) dictates that “[t]he action
may be dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written consent
to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting.”80 Additionally, § 3730(c)(2)(A)
states:
The Government may dismiss the action notwithstanding the objections of the person
initiating the action if the person has been notified by the Government of the filing of

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.

Id. at 839.
Id. at 849.
Id. at 850–51.
Id.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1).

GWYDIR (DO NOT DELETE)

312

4/24/2022 7:59 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 85: 301

the motion and the court has provided the person with an opportunity for a hearing on
the motion.81

Thus, in addition to providing written consent, the court must also provide
the relator with an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.
Where Swift found these two roles to be formalistic in nature and did not
provide the court with discretionary power, Sequoia Orange and CIMZNHCA
found this argument to be unconvincing, and this Note agrees.82 To begin with,
the FCA states in § 3730(b)(1) that a qui tam suit “may be dismissed” with written
consent from the court and the Attorney General.83 Where ‘shall’ is generally
mandatory, ‘may’ implies discretion.84 The use of ‘may’ suggests that the court
and Attorney General could, but are not required, to consent to dismissal
motions. This confers discretionary power on the part of both the court and the
Attorney General. If the statute provided unfettered discretion to the
government in dismissal motions, as Swift held, the court would be required to
grant consent for the dismissal, thus necessitating the use of the term ‘shall’ or
‘must.’85 The alternative use of ‘may’ suggests that the court instead has discretion
in granting the motion, thus presenting a judicial check on prosecutorial power.
Further, the statute requires the court’s approval to grant the motion.86 Under
the surplusage canon of construction, every word of a statute is to be given effect,
and “none should needlessly be given an interpretation that causes it to . . . have
no consequence.”87 Application of Swift’s “unfettered discretion” standard would
render the statutory language here meaningless. Under this standard, the
government need not provide any rationale for dismissal, and a motion to dismiss
would be granted in any and all circumstances.88 Thus, consent from the court, as
required under the statute, would be empty and meaningless.
A similar argument can be made with regards to a relator’s right to a hearing
under § 3730(c)(2)(A). The court in Swift reasoned that the court’s role under §
3730(c)(2)(A) was merely to provide a venue for a relator to “convince the
government not to end the case.”89 But, the law does not require the doing of a
useless thing.90 As stated by the court in CIMZNHCA, “the court is not called
upon to serve as a mere convening authority – ‘and perhaps,’ as the district judge
81. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
82. CIMZNHCA, LLC, 970 F.3d at 850–51; Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir.
2003); United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139, 1145–46
(9th Cir. 1998).
83. § 3730(b)(1).
84. Kingdomware Technologies, Inc., v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 1969, 1977 (2016).
85. See id. (“Unlike the word ‘may’ which implies discretion, the word ‘shall’ usually connotes a
requirement.”).
86. § 3730(b)(1).
87. ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS, SURPLUSAGE CANNON (West 2012); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65 (1936) (“These words
cannot be meaningless, else they would not have been used.”).
88. Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
89. Id.
90. United States ex rel. CIMZNHCA, LLC v. UCB, Inc., 970 F.3d 835, 850 (7th Cir. 2020).
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put it here, ‘serve you some donuts and coffee’ – while the parties carry on an
essentially private conservation in its presence.”91 The court’s role must be more
substantive than that. By providing relators with a hearing, the statute serves as
a check on absolute discretion by the prosecutor. An unfettered right to dismiss
is incompatible with this goal. Thus, contrary to Swift’s suggestion that absolute
deference must be given to government dismissals, there must be a standard by
which courts assess dismissal motions.
B. An Unfettered Right to Dismiss is Incompatible with Congressional Intent
The legislative history of the FCA informs and supports the conclusion that
the court has discretionary power to review motions to dismiss.92 At the crux of
the circuit dispute is whether the court may apply any standard in evaluating a
motion to dismiss a qui tam suit, or if the DOJ has unlimited discretion to dismiss
an action. Where the question is whether a statute precludes judicial review, as
here, the answer is determined “not only from its express language, but also from
the structure of the statutory scheme, its objectives, its legislative history, and the
nature of the administrative action involved.”93 Thus, the legislative history is
important in evaluating this issue.
The 1986 amendments are particularly informative. Congress altered the
FCA in 1986 to provide relators with more power in qui tam actions; specifically,
following the amendments, a relator could maintain his involvement in the suit
even if the government enters the case.94 The House Report makes clear that the
purpose behind this expansion of relators’ rights was to “ensure that the case is
effectively prosecuted on its merits.”95 The Senate Report states,
Subsection (c)(1) provides qui tam plaintiffs with a more direct role not only in keeping
abreast of the Government’s efforts and protecting his financial stake, but also in acting
as a check that the Government does not neglect evidence, cause unduly delay, or drop
the false claims case without legitimate reason.96

This language from the legislative history illustrates a Congressional effort to
ensure that relators have the ability to check prosecutorial discretion in leading
and ultimately settling or dismissing qui tam actions.
With regards to the relator’s right to a hearing under § 3730(c)(2)(A), the
Senate Report explains that a hearing is appropriate “if the relator presents a
colorable claim that the settlement or dismissal is unreasonable in light of the
existing evidence, that the government has not fully investigated the allegations,
or that the government’s decision was based on arbitrary or improper
considerations.”97 This language indicates that Congress’s purpose in drafting this
clause was to ensure that if there was evidence that the DOJ acted unreasonably
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

Id. at 850.
H.R. REP. NO. 99-3753 (1985); S. REP. NO. 99-345 (1986).
Lindahl v. Office of Personnel Management, 470 U.S. 768, 779 (1985).
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1).
H.R. REP. NO. 99-3753, at 95 (1985).
S. REP. NO. 99-345, at 25–26 (1986).
Id.
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or dismissed an action based on improper considerations, a relator would have
recourse through judicial review during their statutorily required hearing.
Further, the Report refers to these hearings as “evidentiary hearings.”98 The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), an agency with similar power to
evaluate private lawsuits on a case-by-case basis, maintains a similar procedure
for requesting evidentiary hearings with the presiding court.99 In this
circumstance under the EPA, the “Presiding Officer will conduct a fair and
impartial hearing on the record, take action to avoid unnecessary delay in the
disposition of the proceedings, and maintain order.”100 Additionally, the Officer
will “[r]ule on motions and other pending procedural matters, including but not
limited to motions for summary disposition.”101 Given the similarities between
the two agencies and their evidentiary hearing procedures, courts should treat
evidentiary hearings under the FCA in the same manner. Thus, during such
hearings, the court must review evidence and apply its discretion in determining
whether the DOJ acted unreasonably or arbitrarily.
This analysis also aligns with the intent of the FCA at its inception. “Lincoln’s
Law”, as the FCA was initially called, sought not only to ferret out fraud
committed by government contractors in the Civil War, but also to address the
widespread corruption of government officials that enabled the fraud to occur at
such high levels.102 The FCA acknowledged the import of relators serving as a
check on government officials who would otherwise overlook the fraud in
exchange for kickbacks and favors from government contractors. An unlimited
governmental right of dismissal would negate any efforts to address this
corruption and is counterintuitive to Congressional purposes in enacting the
FCA.
IV
THE DOJ IS SUSCEPTIBLE TO POLITICAL INFLUENCE AND REGULATORY
CAPTURE
This Note argues that the DOJ is not always an impartial, independent
institution, and its decisions may be influenced by corrupt in-government actors,
or by regulated parties through regulatory capture. Additionally, DOJ decisions
are not always in the public interest, as they may correspond more closely with
other priorities. At times these priorities may be reasonable, as is the case with
inadequate litigation resources in the face of those maintained by defense giants.
However, the reasonableness of these priorities does not justify unfettered
discretion to make consequential decisions without judicial review. The public
should at the very least have notice where decisions are being made by public

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
40 C.F.R. § 78.14; Engstrom, supra note 9, at 647–48.
Id.
§ 78.14(a)(7).
ANDROPHY & BLACK, supra note 4, at § 2.04.
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servants that are biased, corrupt, or demonstrably not in the public interest,
especially those that result in the loss of taxpayer dollars and the dismissal of
meritorious cases that adversely affect the relators involved. This transparency
can be achieved through the application of the Sequoia Orange standard of
review.
A. The DOJ is Susceptible to Influence by Biased Political Actors and Political
Incentives
The DOJ is vulnerable to undue influence exerted by political actors,
especially the President. White House administrations are frequently accused of
inappropriate political influence on DOJ affairs, including investigative
matters.103 The President’s office may exert pressure on DOJ officials through the
use of threats, incentives, or demands for information, which may implicate
reports by confidential informants, undercover operations, or grand jury
materials. Additionally, the President appoints hundreds of DOJ officials, and
though this power is well-established, it may be used to improperly influence
investigative functions. Such opportunities for manipulation have resulted in
numerous attempts by presidential administrations to use federal prosecutorial
power to serve political goals. For example, President Lyndon Johnson ordered
the FBI to investigate and report on civil rights groups and anti-Vietnam war
groups, and President Nixon used the DOJ to investigate political opponents.104
The potential for the DOJ to be unduly influenced by the priorities and
motives of political actors has been particularly clear under the Trump
Administration.105 President Trump’s attempts to intervene in the Russia
investigation and his pardon of former Arizona Sheriff Joe Arpaio caused a
hailstorm of criticism launched against him for inappropriately seeking to
influence the DOJ’s activities. In response, Trump stated “I have the absolute
right to do what I want with the Justice Department.”106 This statement is at the
crux of the argument in this section. If the White House has the absolute right to
control DOJ decisions without judicial review, as with qui tam dismissals under
Swift, the DOJ can hardly be expected to serve as a beacon of impartiality that
exclusively serves the public interest.
During his administration, “President Trump has made unorthodox private
contacts with DOJ officials with responsibility for criminal investigations
touching on his interests; publicly criticized senior DOJ officials for prosecutorial
and investigative judgments; and accused former officials, including his
predecessor, of politically motivated surveillance and criminal conduct.”107 His
103. Wright, supra note 25, at 356–57.
104. Todd David Peterson, Federal Prosecutorial Independence, 15 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y
217, 264 (2020).
105. Wright, supra note 25, at 359–60.
106. Id.; Excerpts From Trump’s Interview With The Times, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 28, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/28/us/politics/trump-interview-excerpts.html [https://perma.cc/8C7WGVRC].
107. Wright, supra note 25, at 360.
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attempts to influence the DOJ can be seen most clearly in the case of Michael
Flynn. Trump pressured former FBI Director James Comey to drop the
investigation into Flynn’s involvement with Trump’s contacts with Russia prior
to the election.108 Trump and his Congressional supporters also pressured DOJ
officials to share sensitive materials from the investigation with Congress.109 This
disclosure hindered the DOJ’s efforts to pursue the ongoing investigation, and
“[m]embers of Congress unabashedly acknowledged that their investigative
efforts had helped the President’s defense.”110 Finally, Trump seemingly fired
Comey with the purpose of hindering the FBI’s investigation into Trump’s affairs
with Russia.111 This type of behavior “exacerbates an already charged political
climate that presents challenges to the exercise of independent professional
judgment on the part of law enforcement and prosecutors.”112 Trump’s actions
present a powerful demonstration of the injustice that can occur when political
actors exert undue influence over the DOJ.
Like other areas of prosecution under the DOJ, the treatment of qui tam suits
is susceptible to undue influence by political priorities and shifts significantly
based on the administration in power. The reality of this phenomenon was
demonstrated most recently by the Granston Memo. Issued under the Trump
Administration, the Memo instructed U.S. Attorneys to seek broad dismissal of
qui tam suits.113 As a result, motions to dismiss qui tam suits over the objections
of relators increased significantly.114 From 2018 to 2020, the DOJ sought dismissal
of almost fifty qui tam suits, the same number it moved to dismiss over the past
thirty years combined.115 The procedural effect of politicization of qui tam suits
may also be seen in the timeliness of intervention and ultimate settlement of qui
tam suits by the DOJ. For example, “[q]ui tam cases relating to controversial war
efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan remained under DOJ investigation longer than
other defense-related cases during the George W. Bush Administration and then
were quickly acted upon during the Obama Administration, suggesting a partisan

108. Id. at 368–69.
109. Peterson, supra note 104, at 258.
110. Id.
111. Wright, supra note 25, at 368–69 (“President Trump reportedly told Russian officials visiting the
Oval Office that firing Comey relieved ‘great pressure’ from the Russia investigation.”).
112. Id. at 361.
113. Memorandum from Michael D. Granston, Director, Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud
Section, to Attorneys, Commercial Litigation Branch, Fraud Section and Assistant U.S. Attorneys on
Factors for Evaluating Dismissal Pursuant to 31 U.S.C. 3720(c)(2)(A) (Jan. 10, 2018),
https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/4358602/Memo-for-Evaluating-Dismissal-Pursuant-to-31U-S.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R8F-N98P].
114. Lydia Wheeler, Government Tosses out More Whistleblower Cases After 2018 Memo,
BLOOMBERG L. (June 24, 2019), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/governmenttosses-out-more-whistleblower-cases-after-2018-memo [https://perma.cc/7NMG-G4J6].
115. James L. Zelenay, Jr. & Sean Twomey, False Claims Act Enforcement Under the Trump
DUNN
&
CRUTCHER
(March
3,
2020),
Administration,
GIBSON,
https://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/constitutional-administrative-law/899884/false-claims-actenforcement-under-the-trump-administration [https://perma.cc/2PG3-9UEY].
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pattern of delay.”116
Political interference in prosecutorial functions is exceedingly problematic.
While the President does retain some authority in resolving prosecutorial
questions, it is in this function that “the crassest forms of politics (involving, at
the extreme, personal favors and vendettas) pose the greatest danger of
displacing professionalism and thereby undermining confidence in legal decisionmaking.”117 An unfettered right to dismiss lawsuits exacerbates this danger.
Given this reality, the judiciary should have the power to review DOJ decisions
to ensure that they are motivated by a rational governmental purpose.
B. The DOJ As an Administrative Agency is Susceptible to Capture by
Regulated Parties
The FCA designates the DOJ as an administrative agency tasked with the
power to evaluate private lawsuits on a case-by-case basis. It is one of numerous
administrative agencies with this power, operating in a similar manner to the
EPA’s oversight of individual lawsuits filed under the citizen suit provisions in
federal environmental statutesand medical malpractice review boards that screen
individual medical malpractice tort cases.118 Administrative agencies serve
important functions in the investigation of claims and ultimate enforcement of
the rule of law. Ideally, these agencies use their expertise and perspective to
weigh aggregate costs and benefits, and determine whether private enforcement
efforts are in the public interest.119 Additionally, agencies may help bolster a
private litigant’s legal resources, which may be vastly deficient in comparison to
those of defendants such as Northrop Grumman and Lockheed Martin in qui tam
suits. This is part of the reason why relators seek and benefit from intervention
by the DOJ.
While administrative agencies can provide gatekeeping functions that are
important to the public interest, agencies are often flawed. One of the most
problematic features of administrative agencies is vulnerability to regulatory
capture.120 “Capture occurs when some special interest, typically an industry
group, persuades government actors to exercise the coercive power of the state
in ways that are not in the ‘public interest.’”121 In the context of gatekeeping
agencies, the concern is that “regulated parties will exert disproportionate
influence over agency gatekeepers, systematically bending gatekeeping decisions
in their favor and thus compromising the agency’s stewardship of zealousness,
coordination, and legislative fidelity within the regime.”122 Susceptibility to

116. Engstrom, supra note 9, at 677.
117. Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 2245, 2357–58 (2001); Wright, supra
note 25, at 389.
118. Engstrom, supra note 9, at 647–48.
119. Id. at 657, 661.
120. Id. at 674.
121. Magill, supra note 27, at 401.
122. Engstrom, supra note 9, at 674.

GWYDIR (DO NOT DELETE)

318

4/24/2022 7:59 PM

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 85: 301

regulatory capture is a significant threat to the efficacy and impartiality of
administrative agencies, especially when so much is on the line for private
litigants.
Other issues counsel against reliance upon administrative agencies in
gatekeeping capacities. An often-cited strength of administrative agencies is their
superior capacity to cull meritless cases. However, research suggests that “case
termination is the gatekeeper task where the competence and capacity gap
between agencies and courts is likely to be narrowest.”123 In other words, courts
are likely equally as capable of rooting out frivolous and meritless cases, and
agencies provide little expertise in this area. Further, agencies rarely use their
termination authority to dismiss cases. This suggests that “while case termination
is the most commonly articulated justification for vesting agencies with
gatekeeper authority, it is also where agencies may be least reliable.”124
The DOJ is not exempt from these risks. In fact, research suggests that the
DOJ is susceptible to regulatory capture. As stated, relators desire DOJ
intervention in qui tam suits because of the significant resources that the agency
brings to a relator’s case. Qui tam suits in which the government has intervened
are more likely to result in a higher settlement for relators.125 The cases in which
the DOJ chooses to intervene tend to reveal the agency’s priorities and
incentives. Recent studies have found that the DOJ is more likely to intervene in
suits brought by former DOJ attorneys that now serve as relator’s counsel.126
Additionally, the agency is less likely to intervene in cases brought against
Fortune 100 companies or top defense contractors. At the bare minimum, these
correlations raise yellow flags.
The intervention rates may have a variety of explanations, the most
concerning of which is corruption. Corrupt relationships between DOJ
decisionmakers and former government officials now working as defense
contractors were certainly a concern of Congressional leaders when enacting the
1986 Amendments.127 Several Congressmen articulated a concern that permitting
the DOJ to independently resolve or dismiss suits opens the door to allowing a
“sweetheart deal” to be worked out between the government and the
contractor.128
A common practice that leads to this concern regarding the DOJ’s
impartiality is the “revolving door” between government work and private
defense contractor work.129 Defense contractors frequently hire former civilian
or military officials of the DOD. It is conceivable that DOJ officials are more
likely to give deference to former government officials now on the side of the

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

Id. at 673.
Id. at 684.
See Press Release, Department of Justice Office of Public Affairs, supra note 39.
Engstrom, supra note 9, at 677.
H.R. REP. NO. 99-3753, at 355 (1985) (statement of Rep. Helmer).
Id.
Engstrom, supra note 9, at 677.
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contractor. “This ‘revolving door’ helps to explain, in part, the limited
government response to defense contractors’ excessive abuses, particularly in
cost overruns and fraud.”130 The implication of this deference is that meritorious
suits brought by relators who make great personal sacrifices to do so may be
dismissed as a result of an unsavory relationship between current and former
government employees.
C. What We Don’t Know Will Hurt Us
Admittedly, the explanation behind the intervention rates is far from certain.
As David Freeman Engstrom, a leading scholar on qui tam litigation, states,
It’s hard to know whether the DOJ’s seeming soft-pedaling of defense cases results from
overly cozy relationships between the Department of defense and the “old generals”
network within the defense contractor establishment, simple overhead political control
(e.g. the Administration’s desire to deflect attention from unpopular war efforts) or a
combination of both.131

The rates could also have more innocuous explanations. For example, the
DOJ may be more apprehensive in the face of the greater litigation resources that
defendants such as top defense contractors and Fortune 100 companies can
deploy.132 Additionally, the DOJ generally has less litigation leverage in these
circumstances because of the unavailability of debarment from government
business as a remedial option for critically important defense contractors.133
These alternative explanations do not help the case for DOJ efficacy and
impartiality. The purpose of qui tam suits is to root out and address fraud
committed against the federal government, with an understanding that such fraud
harms American taxpayers. If the agency is so easily intimidated or dissuaded by
these defendants, this leads to concerns about the reliability of and motivations
behind DOJ decisions not to intervene. From here, the inference is easily made
that because reliability and impartiality of intervention decisions is questionable,
the reliability and impartiality behind decisions to dismiss qui tam suits are also
questionable. There is enough uncertainty here to warrant judicial review of DOJ
dismissal decisions.
This issue is further complicated by the fact that DOJ capture is extremely
difficult to identify in qui tam suits. To know if capture has occurred in any
particular case, critics must know what the public interest outcome would have
been and compare that with the outcome adopted.134 In circumstances where
captured parties dismiss a suit without any scrutiny or oversight, it would be
difficult to evaluate exactly what the public interest outcome would have been
had the court assessed the rational for dismissal against the relators’ interest in
the suit.
130. CLINARD, supra note 30, at 88.
131. Engstrom, supra note 9, at 677.
132. David Freeman Engstrom, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: Empirical Analysis of
DOJ Oversight of Qui Tam litigation under the False Claims Act, 107 Nw. U.L. Rev. 1689, 1735 (2013).
133. Id.
134. Magill, supra note 27, at 401.
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Additionally, it is difficult for legislative oversight committees to detect
capture-related distortions across a large body of individual agency decisions.135
“This is particularly true of qui tam lawsuits, some of which remain under seal
even after the DOJ renders a gatekeeper decision.”136 This prohibits legislative
bodies from identifying and addressing vulnerabilities to capture. In other words,
because legislative oversight committees cannot detect distortions in qui tam
cases across the board that result from capture, they are crippled in their ability
to pass corrective legislation: for example, by providing courts with greater
oversight capabilities.
Lastly, even if legislative oversight committees did notice that capture
plagued qui tam suits, it is difficult or nearly impossible to distinguish among
capture dynamics.137 Congress and other oversight bodies cannot easily identify
which influences have caused an agency like the DOJ to act in a biased way. A
failure to identify the corrupting influences leads to an inability to insulate such
agencies from external pressures. As Engstrom states,
In the FCA context. . .one could insulate DOJ gatekeeper decisions from legislative
pressures that may be skewing them in favor of Fortune 100 companies or defense
contractors by rendering DOJ enforcement efforts self-funding, or by granting agency
officials with gatekeeper duties greater protection from removal. But shielding the DOJ
from political oversight in this way will also grant the agency freer rein to dispense
regulatory favors to former DOJ insiders. In other words, one cannot mitigate one type
of capture without facilitating another.138

This casts doubt on the potential for Congress to solve the agency’s susceptibility
to capture with amendments to legislation. Instead, judicial review is necessary
to address this issue.
V
JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT AS A SOLUTION
A. The Judiciary is Better Suited to Dismiss Qui Tam Suits
Dismissal of lawsuits has historically been a responsibility reserved almost
exclusively for the judiciary. Courts are uniquely situated to assess the merits of
a case through application of governing standards. The key elevating
characteristic of courts is, of course, their impartiality, which results from the
independence of the judiciary from the legislative and executive branches and
the life tenure of federal judges, amongst other contributing factors.139 Where
DOJ officials may be influenced by a number of sources, federal judges are

135. Engstrom, supra note 9, at 678.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 679.
138. Id.
139. U.S. CONST. art. III; see also Paul L. Friedman, Threats to Judicial Independence and the Rule of
Law, AM. BAR ASS’N (Nov. 18, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/initiatives/
committee-on-american-judicial-system/in-the-news/threats-to-judicial-independence-and-rule-of-law/
[https://perma.cc/2MVS-KPYL].
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significantly less susceptible to capture.140 With regard to agency decisions,
judicial review is an effective step in ensuring that the decisions of administrative
agencies are sound, reliable, and based on the merits of the suit rather than on
corrupting influences. Requiring judicial review makes it more difficult for
agencies to adopt policies that favor the private over the public interest. This is
because when reviewing agency decisions, courts apply a merits-based test.
“Under this form of review, a reason that sounds in capture will be quickly
rejected by the court. An agency, that is, could not defend its decision by
explaining that a ‘powerfully connected interest group sought this result.’”141
Subjecting DOJ decisions to judicial review effectively addresses the
consequences of regulatory capture in qui tam dismissals. Courts are better
equipped to assess whether the actions taken were illegal or improper, as the
DOJ may have a conflict of interest. For example, in Sequoia Orange, relators
argued that the DOJ officials were influenced by political lobbyists and campaign
contributions, that pressured officials into dismissing the qui tam suits.142 Courts,
not DOJ officials, are best situated to determine whether officials were in fact so
influenced, and if this influence was unbiased. Under Swift’s unfettered discretion
standard, such an allegation would not even warrant judicial review. The
dismissal would stand, regardless of whether the allegations had merit.
In Swift, the court claimed that because qui tam actions are brought on behalf
of the federal government against defendants that violate federal law by
committing fraud, limiting the DOJ’s right to dismiss qui tam suits would infringe
on the executive’s right under the Constitution to “take Care that the Laws be
faithfully executed.”143 However, this right is not absolute. Courts may still strike
down executive action or unlawful enforcement mechanisms if they violate the
Constitution. As held in Sequoia Orange, judicial oversight under the Ninth
Circuit’s standard does not create a separation of powers issue, as it requires “no
greater justification of the dismissal motion than is mandated by the Constitution
itself.”144 By this, the court was referring to the Due Process Clause’s prohibition
on arbitrary or irrational prosecutorial decisions.145
The Ninth Circuit’s rational-relation test applies in other areas of law that
140. Magill, supra note 27, at 409. See also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Justiciability and Separation of
Powers: A Neo-Federalist Approach, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 393, 398 (“The rule of law presumed that
Congress and the President could not impartially determine whether they had complied with
constitutional provisions that limited their own powers.”).
141. Magill, supra note 27, at 409.
142. United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139, 1146
(9th Cir. 1998).
143. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2003). See also
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (stating that the executive branch is “far better equipped than
the courts to deal with the many variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities.”).
144. Sequoia Orange Co., 151 F.3d at 1146.
145. Id.; see also United States v. Redondo-Lemos, 955 F.2d 1296, 1298–99 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Given
the significance of the prosecutor’s charging and plea bargaining decisions, it would offend common
notions of justice to have them made on the basis of a dart throw, a coin toss or some other arbitrary or
capricious process.”).
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may be considered under the umbrella, and control, of the executive branch. For
example, the Administrative Procedure Act instructs courts to invalidate agency
decisions that the court finds to be arbitrary and capricious.146 This test was
recently applied by a federal judge to an action by the Department of Health and
Human Services under the Trump administration, which attempted to keep Title
X funding from abortion related activities.147 The federal judge issued a
preliminary injunction, arguing in part that the rule was arbitrary and capricious
because it reversed long standing positions of the Department without a valid
reason for doing so. The application of this test through judicial review is upheld
and employed elsewhere today.148
Proponents of the Swift standard may argue that Congress would not approve
of allegedly frivolous or self-serving qui tam suits, and thus the government
should have unlimited power to dismiss these suits.149 This argument assumes that
courts will be unable to police suits that deviate from Congressional intent. This
assumption is baseless here. Courts are more than capable of addressing and
dismissing frivolous or meritless suits, and this does not change in the case of qui
tam actions.150 Further, Congress gave power to private litigants to pursue qui
tam claims. Therefore, parties must defer to Congress and trust that it has already
factored regulatory drift into the decision to delegate enforcement authority to
litigants.151 Because Congress has provided such rights with the purpose of
allowing relators to serve as a check on prosecutorial discretion, Congressional
action has conferred “democratic legitimacy on any and all deviations that
result.”152 In other words, Congress has considered the possibility of an influx of
frivolous suits and determined that the legislation was still important and
effective, regardless of this risk.
Additionally, the claim that qui tam relators are primarily motivated by selfinterest and personal gain at the expense of the public interest is likely

146. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2018).
147. Fred Barbash, Trump Abortion ‘Gag’ Rule Blocked by Federal Judge, WASH. POST (Apr. 25,
2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/trump-abortion-gag-rule-blocked-byfederal-judge/2019/04/25/c147359a-67ac-11e9-a1b6-b29b90efa879_story.html [https://perma.cc/33VWFXKL].
148. See id. (reporting that a federal judge scolded the Department of Health and Human Services
“for offering ‘no reasoned analysis’ for changing the long-standing rule.”).
149. See Engstrom, supra note 9, at 637–39 (explaining that a common critique of private enforcement
is that private enforcers are not politically accountable actors).
150. See United States ex rel. Wickliffe v. EMC Corp., 473 Fed. Appx. 849 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding
that the merit of the suit was insufficient to overcome the government’s rational purposes for motioning
to dismiss); Enter. Recovery Sys. V. Salmeron, 401 Ill. App. 3d 65 (Ill. App. 2010) (finding that relator’s
claims were properly dismissed due to procedural issues); United States ex rel. Sampson v. Crescent City
E.M.S., Inc., 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14147 (E.D. LA 1997) (dismissing a qui tam suit alleging the same
facts and arguments as two prior suits that had both been dismissed as frivolous and non-meritorious,
and assigning Rule 11 sanctions); Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 F.3d 925, 936 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding
that the government met its burden to establish a rational basis to dismiss the suit to further a legitimate
government purpose of preventing the disclosure of classified information).
151. Engstrom, supra note 9, at 638–39.
152. Id.
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exaggerated. Studies have shown that money is not the primary motivating factor
for the majority of relators.153 Many relators only become involved in qui tam
suits after engaging with reporting procedures within their company, or
consulting an attorney for other employment related issues that resulted from
their employer’s misconduct.154 Instead of monetary motivations, “[r]eported
motivations coalesced around four non-mutually exclusive themes: integrity,
altruism or public safety, justice, and self-preservation.”155 Thus, the concern that
relators will use qui tam suits as a method of pursuing improper, undesirable
claims is likely not strong enough to justify Swift’s standard.
Lastly, judicial oversight will not force the DOJ to expend resources that it
does not have. The Ninth Circuit standard does not consider minimizing
administrative costs to be an invalid purpose of dismissal.156 Thus, it will still allow
the DOJ to dismiss suits that would unduly burden government resources, so long
as this is a rational conclusion under the circumstances, and the government’s
motion is not motivated by another improper influence.
B. Swift’s Unfettered Discretion Standard Creates Due Process Concerns
Permitting the DOJ to dismiss qui tam suits with unfettered discretion,
bypassing judicial review, presents due process concerns. The Due Process
Clause states that no one shall be “deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law.”157 As acknowledged by the Seventh Circuit, dismissal under
the FCA impacts an individual relator’s liberty and property rights because of the
interest a relator has in the lawsuit, legitimized by the FCA.158 Relators are
entitled to part of the recovery of qui tam suits.159 Beyond that, relators make
great personal sacrifices in order to bring justice to fraud committed against the
federal government, and by default, American taxpayers.160 Therefore, DOJ
actions must not violate the due process rights of relators.
First, due process requires that an agency action have a reasonable
foundation, that is. “if it rationally pursues a purpose that is lawful for the
(agency) to seek.”161 The Swift standard fails to fulfill this test, as it does not
require any showing of a reasonable foundation for a dismissal.162 The Ninth
153. Aaron S. Kesselheim, David M. Studdert & Michelle M. Mello, Whistle-Blowers’ Experiences in
Fraud Litigation against Pharmaceutical Companies, 362 New Eng. J. Med. 1832, 1834 (2010).
154. ANDROPHY & BLACK, supra note 4, at § 2.10.
155. Kesselheim et al., supra note 153, at 1834.
156. United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139, 1146
(9th Cir. 1998).
157. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
158. United States ex rel. CIMZNHCA, LLC v. UCB, Inc., 970 F.3d 835, 848 (7th Cir. 2020).
159. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1), (d)(2).
160. See Whistleblower: The Case Against Northrop, supra note 11 (narrating the case of qui tam
relator James Holzrichter, who experienced break-ins and tampering with his car and was banned from
the defense industry after bringing suit against Northrup Grumman, eventually ending up homeless with
his family before settling the lawsuit).
161. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 309 (1993).
162. Swift v. United States, 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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Circuit’s rational-relation test, however, reflects and respects the due process
rights of relators by demanding identification of a valid governmental purpose
and a rational relation between dismissal and accomplishment of that purpose.163
Additionally, due process generally requires a hearing in front of an impartial
tribunal.164 In the dismissal of qui tam suits, the “tribunal” right is fulfilled by the
requirement for a hearing where the relator may contest the dismissal. Under the
Swift standard, the result of any deliberation before the tribunal is controlled
solely by DOJ officials.165 As discussed above, the impartiality of these officials is
questionable at best. The danger of undue influence by political actors, corrupt
officials turning a blind eye to fraud, or “overly cozy” relationships with officials
of top government contractors eviscerates the relators’ right to a hearing in front
of an impartial tribunal if DOJ officials control the outcome. Alternatively, under
the Sequoia Orange standard, judicial review mitigates these risks by requiring
an impartial assessment of the rationale for dismissal motions by the court.166
Finally, as discussed, the treatment of qui tam suits by the DOJ is susceptible
to undue influence by political priorities and shifts significantly based on the
administration in power. Again, this is clearly demonstrated by the Granston
Memo and Trump’s interference in DOJ activities throughout his presidency.
This politicization has consequences for the due process rights of relators.
Treatment of qui tam suits under the FCA should be uniform across
administrations to avoid violating a relator’s rights.
Along these same lines, the obligations owed to relators by the DOJ should
likewise be uniform across jurisdictions. As it stands now, DOJ officials must
show a rational purpose for dismissal in all cases within jurisdictions that follow
the Sequoia Orange standard, and in some cases that adhere to the CIMZNHCA
standard; however, the DOJ has unlimited power to dismiss cases without
showing any rational purpose in the D.C. Circuit and others that may choose to
apply the Swift standard.167 The variation in standards presents an opportunity
for the rights of relators to differ under the same federal statute, depending on
the jurisdiction in which they bring suit. This varying treatment is concerning
because of the established interest a relator has in his qui tam suit. A deeper
analysis into the implications of this due process issue is necessary.

163. United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp., 151 F.3d 1139, 1145
(9th Cir. 1998).
164. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 501 (1972) (“Due process requires a competent and impartial
tribunal in administrative hearings.”).
165. Swift, 151 F.3d at 253.
166. Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1145.
167. United States ex rel. CIMZNHCA, LLC v. UCB, Inc, 970 F.3d 835, 851 (7th Cir. 2020); Swift,
151 F.3d at 253; Sequoia Orange, 151 F.3d at 1145.
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VI
CONCLUSION
The FCA requires substantive judicial review of the DOJ’s motions to dismiss
qui tam suits. This statutory interpretation is further justified by the public
interest concerns arising from potential bias on the part of the DOJ, as well as
the threat to due process rights of relators. Threshold judicial review would, at
the very least, address some of the issues created by the susceptibility of the DOJ
to undue political influence and to regulatory capture. The Ninth Circuit’s test
forces the DOJ to justify its decisions, leading to greater transparency with
regards to agency decisions that may result in a failure to recover taxpayer money
or in negative consequences for individual relators. Application of this test will
hopefully lead to a reduction in the number of qui tam suits dismissed by the DOJ
as well.
Given the constitutional issues at play and the sharp divide between circuit
courts, it is likely that the Supreme Court will soon grant certiorari to determine
the standard by which the government may dismiss qui tam suits. The Supreme
Court should adopt the Ninth Circuit’s rational-relation test. This standard best
fits with the statutory language and Congressional intentions. Moreover, the
rational-relation test best serves the public interest by recovering the maximum
amount of fraudulently expended taxpayer money and protecting the rights of
relators to pursue relief.

